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Science Council Commentary  
on the Report on Biosafety Policies and Practices 
 
April 2006 
 
The report 
 
1. The Panel Chair, Dr Brian Johnson, and the Scientific Secretary, Dr Gabrielle Persley, 
presented the Report of the Biosafety Panel to the CGIAR Science Council on Biosafety Policy 
and Practices (SDR/SC:IAR/04/01). Comments were received from members and observers in 
plenary. A Science Council Working Group was later convened under the chairmanship of 
Dr Mike Gale to discuss the report with the Panel Chair and secretary and to review the 
recommendations. 
 
2. The Panel’s report was based on an analysis of a questionnaire and review of case studies on 
living modified organisms (LMOs) provided by the Centers. The report found that all centers 
had in place (or were actively putting in place) effective biosafety policies for their LMO 
research in their host countries. While the policies focused on LMO research, The Panel 
pointed out that, in general, only after product development was there any consideration of 
the regulatory issues needed for release of product in partner countries. The report and the 
recommendations therefore focused on strengthening the development of the Centers’ 
biosafety policies, adding ethical policies where appropriate, and developing a corporate 
regulatory research capacity through an inter-Center network approach. 
 
3. The Panel’s report noted that more could be done to capture the scientific information 
relevant to risk assessment (RA) and, in particular, the RA dossiers that would be needed to 
meet regulatory requirements for the eventual deployment of LMOs. It was suggested that 
consideration be given to undertaking more biosafety research at the CGIAR Centers. The 
existence of codes of practice would give confidence to civil and political society. Moreover, 
Center biosafety codes should be developed with reference to appropriate national 
legislation. 
 
4. The 12 recommendations contained in the report are: 
 
Recommendation 1:  Enhance CGIAR Center Biosafety Policies 
Recommendation 2:  Enhance Capacity Building in National Biosafety Policies and Practices 
Recommendation 3:  Strengthen Center Capacity in Biosafety Practice and Research through 
Pro-active Approaches to Biosafety 
Recommendation 4:  Develop an Integrated Approach to the Practice of Biosafety in the 
Centers 
Recommendation 5:  Establish a CGIAR System Biosafety Network 
Recommendation 6:  Increase Biosafety-related research by the Centers 
Recommendation 7:  Publish and Communicate Results of Biosafety Research 
Recommendation 8:  Prepare for Forestry and Fisheries Biosafety Issues 
Recommendation 9:  Undertake more Risk/benefit Analysis 
Recommendation 10: Develop Plans for Preparing Risk Assessment Dossiers for Product 
Approval 
Recommendation 11: Better Address Bioethical Issues 
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Recommendation 12: Initiate a CGIAR Systemwide Biosafety Workshop to Plan 
Implementation of the Biosafety Panel’s recommendations. 
 
Commentary 
 
5. SC thanked the Chair and his panel for providing an excellent report with very clearly 
justified recommendations on the important subject of biosafety in the CGIAR. The SC did, 
however, express its disappointment that the Terms of Reference framed by iSC had limited 
the Panel to a consideration only of LMOs, which are but one facet of biosafety in the CGIAR. 
The ToRs did not allow the authors to emphasize that biosafety was not only an LMO issue 
but that biosafety considerations should be applied to all CGIAR products. 
 
6. SC was keen to point out that products of transgenic breeding presented no different 
biosafety issues, and should be treated no differently (from the biological stand point of 
environmental risk or food safety) from products improved through any other breeding 
methodologies. It is most important that CGIAR policy does not add to the present confusion 
for consumers by indicating that LMO products present qualitatively different risks to the 
environment. 
 
7. It was clear, of course, that the regulatory frameworks governing the release of LMOs being 
put in place around the globe did require a different approach to information gathering for 
LMOs relative to the products of other breeding technologies. 
 
In general, the SC: 
 
8. Welcomed the proposal to raise awareness of biosafety issues in the CGIAR and to plan and 
further develop biosafety policies (for all products and not just LMOs). 
 
9. Endorsed the idea that ‘business plans’ should be developed from the outset for those LMO 
products destined for release, and that the plans should meet relevant national regulatory 
frameworks. (The concept of an adequate business plan addresses several of the 
Recommendations and so the following responses address issues rather than a sequential 
response to each Recommendation.) 
 
10. Endorsed the organization of Center Biosafety Officers into a CGIAR Biosafety Network to 
share experiences. SC would like to see this group include NARS representatives. This was 
important because the stronger NARS were, in many cases, implementing regulatory policies 
for LMOs independently of the IARCs. Moreover, intergovernmental mechanisms (i.e. 
ASEAN in Asia) have also been effective in networking regulatory research and guidelines. 
The SC believes that the nature and extent of any new biosafety research at Centers should be 
a coordinated product of the new network. 
 
11. Endorsed the implementation of ‘ethics committees’ at all Centers. 
 
More specifically the SC: 
 
12. Supported the notion (in Recommendation 1) that Centers continue to strengthen biosafety 
policies for the product of breeding research, including LMOs. 
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13. Endorsed the need for Centers to consider the regulatory requirements of some LMO 
products, i.e. those intended for eventual release, at an earlier stage of research. The focus 
should be on the development of a full business plan outlining all aspects of regulation and 
pathways for outcomes, including the roles and responsibilities of the Centers and their 
partners involved in the release of the product. The focus of the regulatory requirements 
would be on environmental considerations. 
 
14. Supported the concept that the Centers develop an instrument for enhancing biosafety 
policies and for conducting appropriate regulatory research. The most appropriate 
instrument should be decided by the Centers, drawing on their corporate experience by 
developing a “central advisory service” and networking in other endeavors such as in IPR. 
The mechanism suggested by the Panel is a Biosafety Network (as in Recommendation 5) 
which would seem appropriate. NARS interest and involvement will go beyond enhancing 
capacity in this subject (as suggested in Recommendation 2) because, in all cases, NARS will 
be responsible for the release and deployment of new varieties. They must be involved at the 
outset, in order to prepare in a timely fashion and play their part in the design and planning 
of necessary pre-release research (referred to in Recommendation 3). 
 
15. The network should include CGIAR animal and fish germplasm enhancement scientists 
(Recommendation 8). The network should also include or link to the ISNAR/IFPRI group 
dealing with developing GMO regulatory capacity in developing countries. 
 
16. Noted that there may be a need for the Network to adopt the role of a “central supplier of 
information”. Because of the increased scrutiny of transgenic breeding, preparation to meet 
regulatory standards will be a major part of the business. One key activity of the “central 
supplier of information” should be to ensure that evidence already obtained on particular 
transgenes and events, especially from industry, is made available to the members of the 
network so that work is not duplicated. The Centers are best able to identify the appropriate 
instrument for a “central supplier of information”. 
 
17. Noted that it was particularly important to identify a CGIAR scientist, who, modestly 
funded, would initially coordinate and lead the network. This scientist should explore extra 
funding or international collaboration that might be available outside the System to augment 
approaches to biosafety. 
 
18. Supported the idea that transgenic programs designed to produce varieties or other products 
destined for release (rather than only research application) are associated at the outset with a 
business plan to meet the regulatory requirements of the NARS. This will include plans and 
costings for timely (as in Recommendation 3), integrated approaches (as in Recommendation 
4), and research (including elements of Recommendation 6). It should also include a cost 
benefit analysis (along the lines of Recommendation 9) and plans for the development of ‘risk 
assessment dossiers’ (Recommendation 10). NARS interested in deploying LMO products 
should be involved in these plans. 
 
19. The SC supports the concept of “safety first research” for all breeding products destined for 
release on a case-by-case basis. This may include some special attention to LMOs having a 
high probability of eventual release, and where the results will be of general value for NARS 
dealing with local regulatory issues. Further, the SC encourages research on the appropriate 
regulatory requirements needed for a pro-poor use of the product. Inherent in this concept is 
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that the regulatory requirements are built on a cost benefit analysis and different emphases 
may be required to develop regulatory regimes appropriate to market conditions and to the 
poor. 
 
20. Supported the Recommendation (Recommendation 7) dealing with publication. 
 
21. Agreed that an initial meeting will be necessary to implement the agreed steps addressing 
biosafety (Recommendation 12). Rather than being prescriptive, the SC expects this meeting 
to be convened, and the agenda set, by the new network. 
 
22. Agreed that all Centers be encouraged to establish or strengthen consideration of ethical 
principals in their research (as in Recommendation 11). However SC noted that a separate 
review of ‘Ethics in the CGIAR’ was underway and suggests that action should not pre-empt 
that study due to be completed in 2004. 
 
23. The SC recommends that the Center Directors develop a plan, including the appropriate 
instruments for Networking and for a “central supplier of information” for biosafety policy 
development and implementation by the Centers and for appropriate regulatory research for 
product release. 
 
24. Noted that some funds are available to progress the assembly of the network and 
implementation of an initial meeting, and these could be made available for the agreed-upon 
instruments managed by the network leader’s Center. 
 
25. Stated that it is the intention of the SC to continue to monitor implementation of biosafety 
issues in the CGIAR. 
 
The way forward: 
• CDC should be asked to identify a biosafety coordinator. 
• The coordinator should identify the key CGIAR research staff involved in biosafety policy 
and representatives of NARS. 
• A first meeting with the aims of establishing and harmonizing biosafety regimes over the 
Centers, identifying appropriate biosafety research and identifying the requirements of 
NARS, particularly in the eventual deployment of LMO products. 
• The meeting could well be held back-to-back with a CGIAR genomics meeting, since many of 
the same researchers will be involved. 
• Producing, from the meeting, a clear commentary on the ‘best-practice’ approach to biosafety 
issues in CGIAR Centers. 
• Establish a follow-up review in 2010 (after five years) to monitor progress. 
 
 Biotechnology Advisory Unit 
Roughmoor, Bishop’s Hull, Taunton, UK  TA1 5AA 
Tel +44(0)1823 283211  Fax +44(0)1823 272978 
Email: brian.johnson@english-nature.org.uk 
www.english-nature.org.uk 
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12 February 2004 
Dear Professor Pinstrup-Andersen, 
 
Re:  Report of the Biosafety Panel to the CGIAR Science Council on Biosafety Policy and Practices 
of the CGIAR Centers 
 
 I am pleased to submit to you and your colleagues on the CGIAR Science Council the 
Report of the Panel on Biosafety Policies and Practices, which was commissioned by the interim 
Science Council in 2003. The report contains a discussion of the current biosafety policies and 
practices of the CGIAR Centers, identifies emerging issues, and makes 12 specific 
recommendations as to future strategy, policy and practices.  
 
 The main messages of the Panel’s report are threefold: 
 
1. The CGIAR Centers should be more proactive in considering biosafety issues associated 
with the use of gene technology in food and agriculture earlier in the research phase, 
rather than treating biosafety considerations primarily as a regulatory issue, to be 
addressed if and when a promising new technology is progressing towards the 
development phase. Moving towards such a proactive, research-based approach would 
also better position the Centers to develop the necessary dossiers for seeking regulatory 
approval for their most promising new technologies.  
 
2. The CGIAR Centers, through their world-wide network of scientists and research sites, 
and collections of genetic resources of the world’s major food crops, have under-utilized 
advantages for conducting biosafety-related research. To fulfill this research potential, the 
Centers will need to expand their skills in some areas, especially those related to ecology 
and environmental sciences. Such new international biosafety research may best be 
implemented through an international network of researchers, formed by the CGIAR 
Centers and their research partners.  
 
3. There are many common interests amongst the CGIAR Centers in relation to biosafety 
policy and practices, and the Centers’ roles in supporting national research systems and 
regulatory authorities, but few joint activities. The Panel recommends that the Science 
Council sponsor a workshop to enable the CGIAR Centers and their partners in national 
research systems and regulatory bodies to discuss the Panel’s report and 
recommendations with the Panel members and other stakeholders, and to develop 
implementation plans and budgets for the proposed new activities.  
./... 
Professor Per Pinstrup-Andersen   cc: Dr Vir Chopra 
Chair, CGIAR Science Council    Professor Anne Kapuscinski 
c/o Science Council Secretariat    Professor Norah Olembo 
FAO, Rome, Italy     Dr Gabrielle Persley 
       Dr Amir Kassam 
  
 
 I would like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the Biosafety Panel for their 
dialogue with the Centers, their insights during Panel’s discussions and their contributions to the 
report. The Panel members are Drs Vir Chopra, Anne Kapuscinski and Norah Olembo; Gabrielle 
Persley served as Scientific Secretary of the Panel. The Panel also thanks Dr Amir Kassam for his 
many contributions towards facilitating the work of the Panel. The helpful and efficient 
assistance of the administrative staff of the SC Secretariat in FAO, Rome is also gratefully 
acknowledged. Several other FAO staff members met with the Panel during our meeting in Rome 
in May 2003, and we thank them for sharing their knowledge with us.  
 
 The Center Directors Committee (CDC), and its 2003 Chair, Dr Adel El-Beltagy, were 
especially helpful in facilitating the Panel’s interactions with the Centers, for which we are most 
grateful. I would also like to thank the Director Generals and staff of all the CGIAR Centers for 
their prompt responses to the Panel’s initial questionnaire in May 2003, and for their comments 
and suggestions on the draft report that was circulated later in 2003. Several other stakeholders in 
the CGIAR system commented on the Panel’s draft report and we thank them for their 
suggestions towards improving the report.  
 
 I am pleased to have the opportunity to Chair the Biosafety Panel and I look forward to 
discussing its findings and recommendations with you and your colleagues on the CGIAR 
Science Council in the near future.  
 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Brian Johnson 
Chair 
CGIAR Biosafety Panel 
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study was commissioned by the CGIAR interim Science Council as a strategic study of 
biosafety across the CGIAR system, in order to shed light on current policies, procedures and 
practices and to make recommendations on future biosafety policies and practices for the CGIAR 
system. 
 
The main body of information that formed the basis for the analysis was gained from a 
questionnaire developed by the panel, to guide consultations with the CGIAR Centers and other 
stakeholders. An excellent response was received from the Centers, with almost all Centers 
returning their completed questionnaires and supporting documentation within a short time 
frame. This greatly facilitated the work of the Panel, and is an indication of how seriously the 
Centers regard the issue of biosafety.  
 
The report contains a discussion of the current biosafety policies and practices of the CGIAR 
Centers, identifies emerging issues, and makes 12 specific recommendations as to future strategy, 
policy and practices.  
 
Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) Currently under Development by CGIAR Centers and 
Their Partners 
 
Gene technology has been used by the Centers over the past decade or more to introduce 
potentially useful traits into those crops for which they have designated responsibility within the 
CGIAR system. Molecular techniques are also being used for the development of new vaccines 
for the control of East Coast fever in livestock in Africa.  
 
The Centers and their partners are investigating a wide variety of species/trait combinations, 
using living modified organisms (LMOs), in at least 15 different crop species. These genetically 
modified crops are intended for use in various geographic areas, and are being developed under 
the regulatory systems in operation in these countries. All are currently in the research phase and 
have yet to be taken through the process of regulatory approval for possible commercial release.    
 
The Panel makes several recommendations as to the future development of biosafety policies and 
practices by the CGIAR Centers and across the system; the role of the Centers in capacity 
building within the Centers themselves and with their host and partner countries; the future 
needs for biosafety-related research that may take a more pro-active approach in designing 
beneficial and safe LMOs; on the need for risk/benefit analysis, comparing LMOs with other 
technology options; the need to mobilize additional scientific and financial resources for the 
development of dossiers required by regulatory authorities before taking any promising products 
through to practical use; and finally on ethical considerations in the use of  new gene technology 
in sustainable agriculture.  
 
The main messages of the Panel’s report are threefold: 
 
1. The CGIAR Centers should be more proactive in considering biosafety issues associated with 
the use of gene technology in food and agriculture earlier in the research phase, rather than 
treating biosafety considerations primarily as regulatory issues, to be addressed if and when 
a promising new technology is progressing towards the development phase. Moving towards 
such a proactive, research-based approach would also better position the Centers to develop 
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the necessary dossiers for seeking regulatory approval for their most promising new 
technologies.  
2. The CGIAR Centers, through their world-wide network of scientists and research sites, and 
collections of genetic resources of the world’s major food crops, have under-utilized 
advantages for conducting biosafety-related research. To fulfill this research potential, the 
Centers will need to expand their skills in some areas, especially those related to ecology and 
environmental sciences. Such new international biosafety research may best be implemented 
through an international network of researchers, formed by the CGIAR Centers and their 
research partners. 
3. There are many common interests amongst the CGIAR Centers in relation to biosafety policy 
and practices, and in the Centers’ roles in supporting national research systems and 
regulatory authorities, but few joint activities. The Panel recommends that the Science 
Council sponsor a workshop to enable the CGIAR Centers and their partners in national 
research systems and regulatory bodies to discuss the Panel’s report and recommendations 
with the Panel members and other stakeholders, and to develop implementation plans and 
budgets for the proposed new activities.  
 
A list of 12 specific recommendations follows that elaborates on these main messages. 
 
 
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Recommendation 1 - Enhance CGIAR Center Biosafety Policies 
 
The Panel recommends that the CGIAR Centers continue to develop biosafety policies, governing 
research, technical analysis and transparent, participatory deliberations on the biosafety of their 
research and proposed releases of living modified organisms (LMOs), aimed at achieving 
scientifically reliable and publicly trusted decisions about whether a given LMO developed or 
tested by the Center is sufficiently safe and beneficial to release.  
 
Recommendation 2 - Enhance Capacity Building in National Biosafety Policies and Practices 
 
The Panel recommends that the Centers continue to support their partner countries in developing 
scientifically sound and publicly credible biosafety policies and in building national capacity for 
framing regulations, implementing and monitoring them; and in fostering the skills required for 
the preparation of the dossiers of information on individual LMOs, which form the basis for 
decisions by regulatory authorities. The Centers activities in capacity building should be better 
coordinated with other bilateral and international programs, such as those being implemented by 
the UN agencies in response to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  
 
Recommendation 3 - Strengthen Center Capacity in Biosafety Practice and Research through 
Pro-active Approaches to Biosafety 
 
The Centers need to take a more pro-active approach to biosafety, both for their own biosafety 
practices and for their roles in helping to build national biosafety capacity. In order to achieve 
this, they will need to mobilize additional resources and a broader range of expertise, including 
that which has developed in the public research sector and in the private sector over the past 
decade.  
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Recommendation 4 - Develop an Integrated Approach to the Practice of Biosafety in the Centers  
 
The Centers’ practice of biosafety science needs to develop a more comprehensive approach that 
integrates biosafety research, risk analysis, post release monitoring, and feedback to inform 
future decisions about the use of LMOs in different situations. 
 
Recommendation 5 - Establish a CGIAR System Biosafety Network  
 
A systemwide biosafety network should be established, so as to share experiences, expertise and 
scientific and financial resources for biosafety across the CG system. This network may need to 
access additional expertise in the areas of: (1) system safety science and management; 
(2) evolution and ecology of population, community, and landscape structure and processes; 
(3) facilitation of transparent, representative group deliberations; and, if the Center intends to 
address food safety, (4) public health, toxicology, immunology (to address allergenicity 
questions), food sciences, and related fields.    
 
Recommendation 6 - Increase Biosafety-related Research by the Centers  
 
The Centers should establish and implement a forward-looking and systematic biosafety research 
program, which may be co-ordinated by the biosafety network. This would involve a transparent 
and participatory process for developing key biosafety objectives, identifying key gaps in 
information needed to meet these objectives and pursuing biosafety-related research to fill these 
information gaps.  
 
The biosafety research program should develop scientific methods and generate scientific data on 
safety design of the LMO itself; safety testing and verification; safety management practices, and 
safety monitoring.  
 
Recommendation 7 - Publish and Communicate Results of Biosafety Research 
 
Centers should place a high priority on publishing results of their biosafety research in peer-
reviewed, scientific journals. They should also make their biosafety assessments and biosafety 
research results more accessible to civil society, by putting in place communications policies and 
practices designed to facilitate the dissemination of biosafety information in a publicly accessible 
form. 
 
Recommendation 8 - Prepare for Forestry and Fisheries Biosafety Issues  
 
Although the World Agroforesty Center (ICRAF), CIFOR (forestry) and the World Fish Center 
(WFC) do not presently work on LMOs, groups that they work with are likely to seek their help 
with biosafety issues in the future. These Canters should prepare themselves for this eventuality 
through active participation in a systemwide biosafety network and in biosafety training of staff 
members. 
 
Recommendation 9 - Undertake more Risk/benefit Analysis  
 
The Panel recommends that the Centers develop the capacity and seek additional resources for 
undertaking risk/benefit analyses of all LMOs under development. Specifically, the Panel 
recommends that Centers:   
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• Develop and adopt formal methods for risk/benefit analysis of LMOs intended for 
commercial use. These should be based on credible research data, aimed primarily for use 
within the Center as part of their research prioritization and justification program, but which 
can also be used more widely.   
• Seek partners within target countries with the aim of developing risk/benefit analyses for the 
use of particular LMOs within specific territories. 
• Identify sufficient resources, within the Center and in partnership with target country 
institutes and industry, to carry out risk/benefit analysis at the earliest possible stage in the 
development of an LMO. 
• Identify sources and repositories for socio-economic, agronomic, ecological and human 
health data and expertise needed for risk/benefit analysis and support capacity building in 
this area. 
• Incorporate comparisons, based on reliable research, including socio-economic research of the 
benefits and safety of an LMO relative to alternative methods of addressing the particular 
agricultural or food security problem. 
 
Recommendation 10 - Develop Plans for Preparing Risk Assessment Dossiers for Product 
Approval  
 
The Panel recommends that, in relation to the LMOs presently under development by the CGIAR 
Centers and their partners, the Centers need to assess the feasibility of some or all of these 
becoming new products. Plans for preparing risk assessment dossiers should be put in place at 
the earliest opportunity and should include realistic estimates of the scientific and financial 
resources that will be required to develop the dossiers, on which regulatory authorities will base 
their decisions about product approval. 
 
Recommendation 11 - Better Address Bioethical Issues 
 
The Panel recommends that:  
 
• Centers share their experiences and develop a unified approach to the production and 
maintenance of ethical codes covering research and development of LMOs. 
• Centers identify key stakeholders both in their host countries, target countries and among 
donors and promote their involvement in developing and maintaining ethical codes. 
• Each Center maintains a standing Ethics Committee advising the Biosafety Committee. We 
recommend that the role of the Ethics Committee should be both to maintain ethical 
standards and codes used by the Center, and to consider and address the ethical dimensions 
both of the Center research program as a whole, and individual research projects. We 
recommend that the Committee has at least half of its members drawn from stakeholder 
bodies outside the Center, and reports directly to the Center Director General.  
• Centers and CGIAR as a whole publicize their development and use of ethical codes aiming 
to increase public confidence in their research.  
 
Recommendation 12 - Initiate a CGIAR Systemwide Biosafety Workshop to Plan 
Implementation of the Biosafety Panel’s Recommendations  
 
The Panel recommends that, in order to ensure that the results of the CGIAR investments in gene 
technology are able to be used with safety and confidence, the Biosafety Panel report and its 
recommendations be discussed at a workshop involving members of the CGIAR Science Council, 
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the Biosafety Panel, representatives of the CGIAR Centers, their R&D partners and other 
stakeholders, including national regulators, policy makers, civil society, farmers and consumers.  
 
The purpose of the workshop would be to develop an implementation plan for a proactive 
approach to biosafety by the Centers and their partners.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
During the last decade the CGIAR Centers have initiated and / or intensified efforts to harness 
the advantages of modern biology (biotechnologies) for genetic enhancement of a range of traits, 
generating materials and products for upgrading the efficiency of agricultural enterprise. The 
major traits targeted in plant species are improved productivity, resistance to pests and diseases, 
tolerance to abiotic stresses and enhancement of nutritional quality. In the product development 
area, attention is being given to applications such as vaccines for animal health care and 
diagnostics for pest surveillance and biodiversity monitoring and conservation. 
 
Across the CGIAR system as a whole, the Group has affirmed its view of the value and relevance 
of biotechnologies in furthering the missions and mandates of its Centers. The Group has 
emphasized that efforts made in developing and deploying new biotechnologies will be directed 
to generating public goods. The Centers involved in activities in gene technology are developing 
biosafety policies and practices to safeguard the well-being of staff undertaking research 
activities and to ensure as far as possible that any potential products are benign to human and 
animal health and the environment.  
 
This study was commissioned by the CGIAR interim Science Council in 2002 as a strategic study 
of biosafety across the CGIAR system, in order to shed light on current policies, procedures and 
practices and to make recommendations on future biosafety policies and practices across the 
CGIAR system. The Terms of Reference for the Study are attached (Annex A).  
 
Panel Members 
 
A study panel was established in January 2003. Dr Brian Johnson (English Nature UK) was 
appointed Panel Chair, with Professors Vir Chopra (National Academy of Agricultural Sciences, 
India), Anne Kapuscinski (University of Minnesota, USA) and Norah Olembo (University of 
Nairobi, Kenya) as Panel Members; Dr Gabrielle Persley (the Doyle Foundation) is the Scientific 
Secretary of the Panel. Dr Amir Kassam is the Resource Person from the CGIAR Science Council 
Secretariat. Contact details for the Panel Members are given in Annex B.  
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2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY  
 
The CGIAR Centers and their partners are developing a range of new technologies to improve 
the livelihoods of poor people in developing countries. These technologies may include new 
plant varieties developed with the aid of breeding techniques such as embryo rescue, wide 
crosses and/or marker-assisted selection. Some applications of gene technology may result in new 
molecular diagnostics for plant and animal diseases, improved biocontrol agents and new 
vaccines for the control of livestock diseases. Other applications of gene technology may lead to 
the development of living modified organisms (LMOs). All new technologies for agriculture (e.g. 
new plant varieties, diagnostics, biocontrol agents and animal vaccines) require an appropriate 
regulatory framework, and biosafety assessment as to their risks and benefits in particular 
environments. However, the scope of this study is limited to the biosafety issues associated with 
the use of living modified organisms (LMOs).  
 
Living modified organism (LMO) means any living organism that possesses a novel combination of 
genetic material obtained through the use of transgenic technology. LMO is a synonym of 
genetically modified organism (GMO).  
Biosafety refers to policy and practices used to ensure the safe use of living modified organisms in 
research and in food, agriculture and the environment.  
 
The CGIAR Centers have the potential to develop LMOs in a wide range of species of crops, 
micro-organisms, trees, fish and livestock. However, only LMOs in crops and micro-organisms 
are currently under investigation by some of the Centers.  
 
The Centers are also directly concerned with policy and management aspects of biosafety, both in 
designing and implementing their own internal biosafety policy and practices and in advising 
their host and partner countries on establishing and managing effective national biosafety 
systems. In regard to capacity building in national programs, ISNAR and IFPRI are the managing 
agents for a major new USAID-supported Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS) in developing 
countries. This program also involves several other CGIAR Centers amongst its collaborators. 
Further details on the program are available at www.agbios.com 
 
There are ethical as well as scientific and economic issues associated with the safe use of LMOs in 
food, agriculture and the environment. The panel considered the extent to which the Centers 
were addressing ethical issues, and the appropriate means by which they could address these 
complex issues. 
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3 STUDY METHODOLOGY 
  
The main body of information that formed the basis for the analysis in this study was gained 
from a questionnaire developed by the panel, to guide consultations with the CGIAR Centers and 
other stakeholders. A copy of the panel’s questionnaire, and the covering letter sent to the Center 
Directors in May 2003 are attached (Annex D). An excellent response was received from the 
Centers, with almost all Centers returning their completed questionnaires and supporting 
documentation within a short time frame. This greatly facilitated the work of the Panel, and is an 
indication of how seriously the Centers regard the issue of biosafety.  
 
The Panel gained additional information from documentation, meetings with personnel from 
other organizations, and from personal contact with the Centers by Panel members. The Panel 
also met with key staff within FAO when the Panel met in Rome in May 2003. An earlier draft of 
this report was circulated to the Centers and other stakeholders in October 2003, and their 
comments are reflected in this document.  
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4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
4.1 Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) under Development by the CGIAR Centers and 
Their Partners  
The Centers and their partners are investigating a wide variety of species/trait combinations, 
using living modified organisms (LMOs), in at least 15 different crop species. These genetically 
modified crops are intended for use in various geographic areas, and are being developed under 
the regulatory systems in operation in these countries. All are currently in the research phase and 
have yet to be taken through the process of regulatory approval for possible commercial release. 
 
Gene technology has been used by the Centers over the past decade or more to introduce 
potentially useful traits into those crops for which the individual Center has designated 
responsibility within the CGIAR system. Some examples are listed in Table 4.1. Molecular 
techniques are also being used of the development of new vaccines for the control of East Coast 
fever in livestock in Africa.  
 
Several Centers have initiated programs in gene technology as an aid for crop improvement, 
targeting mainly transgenic resistance to biotic stresses in crops. Research involving Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) genes is being conducted to address insect resistance in rice, maize, pigeon pea, 
chickpea, sorghum and cowpea. Other Center efforts are directed towards developing LMOs 
resistant to bacterial, fungal and viral diseases in rice, pigeon pea, and groundnuts respectively.  
 
These LMOs are intended for use in various geographic areas. They are being developed under 
national regulatory systems in operation in the countries concerned. All LMOs are currently in 
the research phase and have yet to be taken through the process of regulatory approval for 
commercial release.  
 
The Centers are not yet developing transgenic lines of fish or trees. However, gene technology is 
being used in the Centers with responsibilities for trees (CIFOR) and agroforestry (ICRAF) for the 
characterization of biodiversity, and for the development of marker assisted selection for traits 
such as rapid growth and pest and disease resistance in trees and other agro-forestry species.  
 
4.2 Synopsis of Case Studies   
Several Centers provided details to the Panel of the development of some of the selected LMOs, 
in the form of case studies. Both the Centers and their partners are addressing biosafety issues 
during the research phase. The case studies examined by the Panel are summarized in Table 4.2. 
They include the following applications of gene technology in the development of living 
modified organisms:   
 
• Maize with Bt genes for insect resistance 
• Rice with Xa21 gene for bacterial blight resistance 
• Rice with Bt genes for insect pest resistance 
• West African rice cultivars with resistance to rice yellow mottle virus and to nematodes 
• Rice resistant to rice hoja blanca virus  
• Beans with drought tolerance  
• Cassava with resistance to stem borer  
 14 
• Cowpea with transgenes for resistance to Maruca vitrata   
• Groundnuts with transgenes for resistance to the Indian Peanut Clump Virus  
• Potato with Bt resistance to potato tuber moth 
• Recombinant vaccines against East Coast Fever in cattle in Africa. 
 
Table 4.1 Living Modified Organisms (LMOS) under Development by CGIAR Centers and their 
Partners  
CGIAR CENTER LMOs UNDER DEVELOPMENT 
CIMMYT, Mexico 
 
IRRI, Philippines 
 
 
 
 
 
ICRISAT, India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIAT, Colombia 
 
 
 
IITA, Nigeria 
 
 
 
CIP, Peru 
 
ILRI, Kenya 
 
 
WARDA, West Africa 
 
IPGRI 
 
 
 
ICARDA  
 
 
Maize: Bt maize (Mexico and Kenya) 
 
Rice: Xa 21 for bacterial blight 
Chitinase/NPRI genes for sheath blight 
Bt genes for stem borer, leaf folder 
Crt1, psy, lcy genes for pro vitamin A (golden rice)  
Ferritin gene for enhanced iron  
 
Groundnut resistant to Groundnut Rosette Disease (GRD) and Peanut Clump 
Virus (IPCV) 
Pigeon pea resistant to pod borer and fungal pathogens, (Phytophthera and 
Fusarium blight) and to Helicoverpa armigera insects 
Sorghum: Bt sorghum 
Chick pea: Bt chick pea 
 
Beans:  Drought tolerance 
Cassava:  Bt for resistance to stem borer 
Rice: Resistant to Rice Hoja Blanca Virus (RHBV) 
 
Cowpea: Bt cowpea 
Plantain:  with anti fungal genes; Cassava:  low cyanide content; African cassava 
mosaic virus resistance 
 
Potato: Bt potato 
 
Livestock vaccines: P67 vaccine for East Coast Fever (ECF); Schizont vaccine for 
ECF 
 
Rice: Resistant rice to Rice Yellow Mottle Virus (RYMV) 
 
Banana, with disease resistance (being developed through a joint program with 
the Government of Uganda, INIBAP, IITA, KUL-Belgium, CIRAD- France on 
improving East African bananas in Uganda 
 
Chickpea with disease and abiotic stress resistance 
Lentil with disease and abiotic stress resistance, 
Barley and wheat with abiotic stress resistance (with AGERI, Egypt) 
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4.3 Biosafety Policies and Practices at the CGIAR Centers  
Cohen et al. (1999) have identified the following four major elements for developing and 
implementing biosafety policies and practices:  
 
1. Written guidelines – to clearly define the structure of the biosafety system, the roles and 
responsibilities of those involved and the review process; 
2. Regulatory authorities – comprising well trained individuals in the host country, who are 
confident about their decision-making ability and to ensure the support of their institutions; 
3. An information system – enabling the biosafety evaluation process to be based on up-to-date 
and relevant scientific information and the concerns of the community; and to ensure that 
biosafety data and procedures are recorded and archived; 
4. A feedback mechanism – for incorporating new information and revising the regulatory 
system. 
 
The written guidelines may include the Terms of Reference (TORs) of biosafety committees and 
biosafety officers. They may also include specific text or documents on aspects of biosafety, 
including safety regulations in the laboratories, in the field, and in transit. Regulatory authorities 
may include both national and institutional committees or bodies who are involved in approving 
research. Information systems include public and institutional awareness materials as well as 
records and databases. A policy statement may also be included. The feedback mechanism 
should include the establishment of a responsible body and procedures to report on, monitor and 
adjust current research, events or regulatory systems. 
 
Criteria for Assessing Effectiveness of the Centers’ Biosafety Policies and Organizational 
Structures 
 
The panel used the following general criteria to develop the part of the questionnaire designed to 
assess effectiveness of the current biosafety systems in operation at the CGIAR Centers:   
 
• Availability of a specific biosafety policy framework and documented guidelines for 
procedures and practices, developed by a wide range of stakeholders; 
• Existence of an effective and transparent biosafety committee structure in both the Centers 
and host countries; 
• Adequate coordination between Center and host country biosafety and regulatory systems; 
• Science-based identification of biosafety issues concerning genes/gene sources, regulatory 
sequences, selectable markers, target environments for release and purpose of deployment of 
the LMOs for food, feed, and industrial uses; 
• Timely, objective and transparent clearance and approval procedures; 
• Effective biosafety monitoring mechanisms; 
• Availability of legal frameworks for biosafety in the host and partner countries with whom 
the Centers collaborate. 
 
Current Biosafety Systems in Operation at the CGIAR Centers  
Implementation of a biosafety regulatory process requires a functional structure and an 
operational plan. These two elements are required both at the institutional and national levels for 
overseeing and ensuring that experiments in laboratories and green houses and trials under 
containment and open field conditions are undertaken with adequate safeguards. In the context 
of applications of biotechnologies by the CGIAR Centers, these responsibilities are discharged by 
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designated committees at Center and host country levels and with small variations of 
nomenclature are termed Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) and National Biosafety 
Committees, respectively.  
 
Biosafety Committee Composition  
The expertise represented on the bodies/committees entrusted with developing regulatory 
frameworks is widely variable both in the case of Centers and the Host Counties. The Centers 
rely on their staff scientific expertise (biological and social sciences) with added representation 
from Host Country authorities on their Institutional Biosafety Committees.  
 
National Biosafety Committees 
The National Biosafety Committee in the Host Country (the nomenclature is variable) is the 
responsible body to frame, regulate and monitor biosafety aspects of biotechnological research, 
field evaluations, release into the open environment and commercialization of biotechnology-
based products. In some countries, laws have been passed and in others they are at various stages 
of enactment to give legal status to these Committees.  
 
The composition of National Biosafety Committees in different Countries is variable.  They tend 
to have a high representation of administrators from Government departments. Consumer 
groups and members of the civil society are under represented on most national committees. 
Center staff representation on these Committees is infrequent. 
 
Findings 
 
1. Most of the Centers using gene technologies have formally constituted Institutional Biosafety 
Committees whose duties and responsibilities (though they vary from Center to Center) have 
been defined. Some Centers have appointed specific Biosafety Officers while in others a 
Principal Investigator acts as the nodal, coordinating person. 
 
2. As criteria for action, most Centers have prepared Institutional Biosafety Guidelines, 
primarily developed by Center staff, in accordance with the requirements of their respective 
host country national regulatory authorities. 
 
3. The Institutional Biosafety Committees are charged with implementing good laboratory 
practices for biotechnology-related research in laboratories and greenhouses and the required 
biosafety regulations in trials of LMOs under containment.  
 
4. These Institutional Biosafety Committees also oversee the preparation of risk assessments 
reports.  
 
5. Recommendations of the Center’s institutional biosafety committee are advisory, with final 
decisions entrusted to the Center Director General, with approval of the National Biosafety 
Committee. 
 
6. Applications for approval of biotechnology-related research involving the use of LMOs 
generally follow the route of: Investigator/Developer of LMO, to Institutional Biosafety 
Committee, to National Biosafety authority for clearance and approval to proceed with 
laboratory, greenhouse, and /or field evaluations of LMOs.  
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Recommendation 1 - Enhance CGIAR Centers’ Biosafety Policies 
 
The Panel recommends that the CGIAR Centers continue to develop biosafety policies, governing 
research, technical analysis and transparent, participatory deliberations on the biosafety of their 
research and proposed releases of LMOs, aimed at achieving scientifically reliable and publicly 
trusted decisions about whether a given LMO developed or tested by the Center is sufficiently 
safe and beneficial to release.  
 
Recommendation 2 - Enhance Capacity Building in National Biosafety Policies and Practices  
 
The Panel recommends that the Centers continue to support their partner countries in developing 
scientifically sound and publicly credible biosafety policies; in building national capacity for 
framing regulations, implementing and monitoring them; and in fostering the skills required for 
the preparation of the dossiers of information on individual LMOs, which form the basis for 
decisions by regulatory authorities. The Centers activities in capacity building should be better 
coordinated with other bilateral and international programs, such as those being implemented by 
the UN agencies in response to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  
 
4.4 Biosafety Practice: Science, Research, and Capacity Building 
This discussion assumes that the main goal of CGIAR Center involvements in gene technology is 
to develop and release beneficial and safe LMOs that enjoy broad acceptance and wide adoption. 
The Centers are pursuing this goal at a time when the social contract between science and society 
is undergoing a major transformation. Instead of expecting science to produce ‘reliable’ 
knowledge and then communicate its findings to society, this new social contract expects science 
and its technological applications to be ‘scientifically reliable’ and ‘socially robust’, as well as 
open and transparent, in order to gain broad acceptance (Gibbons 1999). Decisions and actions 
regarding the biosafety of specific LMOs therefore require greater integration of science with 
participatory processes and policy than in the past.  
 
What does it take for the Centers to achieve scientifically reliable and publicly trusted biosafety 
practices for LMOs on the ground? They obviously need to operate and be seen to operate within 
appropriate legislative and policy frameworks of the countries where the LMO activities occur, 
and in a manner consistent with the Center’s own biosafety policy and practices. Legislation and 
policy alone, however, cannot achieve beneficial and safe uses of LMOs. Also needed are 
complementary, on-the-ground biosafety practices starting as far ahead of LMO releases as 
possible. 
 
The practice of biosafety is a learned, material practice that should focus on accident prevention 
and learning from mistakes via scientific and participatory processes, starting at the earliest stage 
of LMO design through research, development and final use of particular LMOs. This is the 
central wisdom gained from over 100 years of safety movements and safety work on other 
complex technologies that offered benefits while posing potential risks and that led to the 
professions of system safety science and management (Aldrich 1997, McIntyre 2000, 
Kirwan 2001). 
 
In recent successful cases of taking such a ‘safety first’ approach to uses of technology 
(Kapuscinski et al. 2003), “an analytic-deliberative process has evolved whereby potentially 
affected parties in the private and public sectors collectively identify key safety issues to be 
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addressed, which in turn has produced knowledge and agreements about safety that met and 
moved beyond scientific ‘reliability’ to ‘socially robust’ and publicly credible arrangements 
(Gibbons 1999)”.  
 
Parties involved in developing, regulating or analyzing LMOs have yet to explicitly and fully 
adapt the principles and methods of system safety science and management to the biosafety of 
LMOs (Baram 2002). There is tremendous potential to build upon the biosafety practices already 
in place in certain countries, companies and CGIAR Centers. This will require a conscious shift 
away from the prevailing and conflict-prone, risk-focused approach and towards a more 
forward-looking, ‘safety first’ approach that is better equipped to reach scientifically based and 
widely trusted conclusions about whether an LMO is sufficiently beneficial and safe to release. 
Indeed, the CGIAR Centers are ideally situated to lead this shift in a manner that fits the needs 
and situations of developing countries. 
 
The prevailing risk approach typically involves over 10-15 years of research and development 
before carrying out major work on risk assessment and management (Figure 4.1). Quite far 
downstream in terms of the LMO developmental time, and at the point of seeking regulatory 
approval for field tests, developers conduct risk assessments and develop measures (such as 
isolation) to try to manage risks. The field tests themselves focus on gathering data on 
agricultural traits and rarely build on research designed to test or verify the assessment of 
environmental safety of the LMO. Risk assessment and management then get central attention at 
the far end of the process, when private companies or public institutions seek approval for 
commercial releases and export/import of an LMO. Waiting until this late stage puts all parties - 
from LMO developers and regulators to potential users and concerned citizens - into a reactive 
mode that tends to fuel controversy and conflict. This can lead to inordinate delay or even 
rejection of the LMO, wasting invested resources. 
 
In contrast, the goal of the preventative safety first approach is to anticipate and prevent 
biosafety problems as far upstream of LMO release as possible (Figure 4.2). The main elements of 
the safety first approach include:  
 
• Initial safety criteria setting through preventative risk assessment, safety design (of the LMO 
itself) and planning to reduce and control identified risks;  
• Safety verification testing of the LMO through appropriate lab and field tests;  
• Safety follow-up (monitoring) to promptly detect unforeseen problems and take corrective 
action; and  
• Safety leadership via training and independent certification of biosafety professionals, a safety-
oriented management style in public and private institutions involved with LMOs, and a 
framework for managing the application of cross-institutional safety standards.  
 
By making safety a primary consideration throughout the process of developing, producing and 
using an LMO, the safety first approach avoids the pitfalls of the prevailing risk approach while 
directing resources towards the development, release and adoption of LMOs credibly shown to 
be sufficiently beneficial and safe. 
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Figure 4.1 Prevailing Risk Approach to Biosafety 
Note to Figure 4.1: The prevailing risk-focused approach to biosafety of LMOs applies major work on risk assessment and risk 
management quite late in the lengthy process of research, development, and regulatory decision-making (depicted by grey 
borders around the later steps). Field tests conducted as part of seeking regulatory approval rarely include empirical tests to 
estimate the ecological risk or safety of the LMO in the range of environments where it might be produced commercially; 
environmental risk/safety information collected for the conditions of one country may not be adequate for assessing risk/safety 
under the environmental conditions of a country of import.  
Source:  Kapuscinski (2003).  
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Figure 4.2 Safety-first Approach to Biosafety 
 
Note to Figure 4.2: The pro-active, safety-first approach is designed to anticipate and prevent biosafety problems as far 
upstream of LMO release as possible. It stresses risk assessment and management early on (depicted by grey borders around 
early steps) and adds explicit steps pre- and post-commercialization to verify and monitor safety (depicted by black borders 
around middle and later steps). Safety criteria are negotiated at the outset through transparent and representative deliberations, 
informed by the best available scientific information. The safety criteria set the objectives for the subsequent processes of safety 
design, risk reduction planning, the building in of bioconfinement or other safety measures, initial and field safety verification 
tests, and post-commercialization monitoring. Source: Kapuscinski (2003). 
 
Findings on Biosafety Practices at the Centers  
 
The Panel reviewed the Center responses to the questionnaire, and analyzed the case studies to 
arrive at summary findings and recommendations regarding biosafety practice in terms of 
biosafety science, research and capacity building. The main findings and recommendations are 
summarized below:  
 
1. All Centers meet or exceed the capacity and requirements of their host country to govern the 
biosafety of LMOs. Some host countries are still developing their biosafety governance 
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frameworks. In a few cases, the lack of adequate host country regulatory capacity is 
constraining further research by the Center. 
 
2. Most of the Centers are actively helping their host country to develop its biosafety 
governance frameworks and most identified multiple biosafety capacity needs for the host 
country and other countries they work in. 
 
3. The Centers are currently focused on containing and confining LMOs within projects 
underway in labs, glass/screen houses or field tests, using apparently adequate containment 
and confinement practices. The main objectives of the current research projects are to develop 
LMOs and measure their agriculturally important traits. These projects generally involve 
little or no specific biosafety related research objectives.  In some instances, the Centers are 
able to draw on biosafety-related work conducted elsewhere (e.g. resistance management in 
relation to Bt genes). However, in other cases, environmental impact assessments are being 
initiated by some Centers to assess risks associated with LMOs in particular environments. 
 
4. Some Centers have plans for, or are conducting, biosafety research projects and/or 
risk/benefit analyses on LMOs. The current biosafety research of the Centers focuses on two 
main issues: gene flow and marker genes, including the avoidance of antibiotic and herbicide 
resistance markers in gene constructs.  
 
The submitted descriptions of current biosafety field research projects by some Centers 
indicate intelligent study designs that facilitate gathering important baseline information - for 
instance, on patterns and levels of gene flow from crop varieties to wild or weedy relatives - 
without requiring environmental release of the LMO. 
 
5. In relation to gene flow, the Centers have a particular responsibility and a research advantage 
since they are located in the Centers of diversity of the world’s major food crops and their 
wild and weedy relatives. 
 
6. In relation to marker genes, CIP has undertaken research on identifying non-antibiotic, 
selectable marker genes for use in potato and sweet potato. CIAT is moving its safety design 
of genetic constructs to “precision genetic engineering” involving tissue-specific expression. 
This is an example of good safety design because it should reduce variability in transgene 
expression, which should reduce variability in overall LMO behavior and, in turn, improve 
the predictability of biosafety tests. IRRI has developed marker-free Bt and Golden indica rice 
that may have added value and public acceptance of LMOs.  
 
7. The Centers have impressive strengths in the kinds of agricultural sciences needed for 
biosafety science and decision-making. They generally lack essential and complementary 
expertise in system safety science and management; evolution and ecology of population, 
community, and landscape structure and processes; and, if the Center intends to address 
human health safety aspects, public health, toxicology, immunology (to address 
allergenicity), food sciences, and related fields. The Panel is unsure to what extent their staffs 
include professional facilitators/social scientists skilled in managing multi-stakeholder 
deliberative and participatory processes on highly technical and controversial issues. 
 
8. Centers differ on whether they should address the food safety aspects of LMOs. Several 
prefer to direct such work to existing national institutions that they believe have the 
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appropriate capacity. Others expressed a desire to undertake LMO food safety research and 
analysis within the Center in the future.  
 
9. There appears to be no empirical research underway to directly compare the benefits and 
safety of an LMO to alternative methods of addressing the particular agricultural problem at 
issue. The questionnaire did not specifically request such information so it is possible that 
certain Centers are planning or conducting such comparative research. Several Centers did 
identify socio-economic effects as an area of future biosafety research, something that could 
be addressed through appropriately designed comparative research. 
 
10. There is a general congruence of thinking among Centers regarding future biosafety - related 
research needs. The priority areas are:  
 
• Safety of new GM-derived foods and feed for human and animal consumption;  
• Effects of LMOs on non-target organisms;   
• Gene flow and environmental safety;   
• Resistance management, especially in relation to the deployment of Bt genes for insect 
resistance, a common trait being explored for several crops; 
• Socio-economic aspects of deploying GM crops; and  
• Effective models for public awareness.  
 
Other important areas in safety design research are on better control of the number of transgene 
copies and integration sites in the LMO genome; and biological confinement methods such as 
inducible expression of transgenes and blocking of reproductive traits. Safety verification 
research would have to expand from studying pathways of LMO and transgene movement (e.g. 
gene flow) to include research on possible environmental and human health consequences (i.e. 
negative, neutral or positive) of transgene movements.  
 
Recommendations for Strengthening Biosafety Practice and Biosafety Research 
by the CGIAR Centers 
 
Recommendation 3 - Strengthen Center Capacity in Biosafety Practice and Research through 
Pro-active Approaches to Biosafety 
 
The Centers need to take a more pro-active approach to biosafety, both for their own biosafety 
practices and for their roles in helping to build national biosafety capacity. In order to achieve 
this, they will need to mobilize additional resources and a broader range of expertise, including 
that which has developed in the public research sector and in the private sector over the past 
decade.  
 
Recommendation 4 - Develop an Integrated Approach to the Practice of Biosafety in the Centers 
 
The Centers’ practice of biosafety science needs to develop a more comprehensive approach that 
integrates biosafety research, risk analysis, post release monitoring, and feedback to inform 
future decisions about the use of LMOs in different situations. 
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Recommendation 5 - Establish a CGIAR System Biosafety Network 
 
A systemwide biosafety network should be established, so as to share experiences, expertise and 
scientific and financial resources for biosafety across the CG system. This network may need to 
access additional expertise in the areas of: (1) system safety science and management; 
(2) evolution and ecology of population, community, and landscape structure and processes; 
(3) facilitation of transparent, representative group deliberations; and, if the Center intends to 
address food safety, (4) public health, toxicology, immunology (to address allergenicity 
questions), food sciences, and related fields.  
 
Recommendation 6 - Increase Biosafety Related Research by the Centers  
 
The Centers should establish and implement a forward-looking and systematic biosafety research 
program, which may be co-ordinated by the biosafety network. This would involve a transparent 
and participatory process for developing key biosafety objectives, identifying key gaps in 
information needed to meet these objectives and pursuing biosafety-related research to fill these 
information gaps.  
 
The biosafety research program should develop scientific methods and generate scientific data on 
safety design of the LMO itself; safety testing and verification; safety management practices, and 
safety monitoring.  
 
Recommendation 7 - Publish and Communicate the Results of Biosafety Research 
 
Centers should place a high priority on publishing results of their biosafety research in peer-
reviewed, scientific journals. They should also make their biosafety assessments and biosafety 
research results more accessible to civil society, by putting in place communications policies and 
practices designed to facilitate the dissemination of biosafety information in publicly accessible 
ways.  
 
 
Recommendation 8 - Prepare for Forestry and Fisheries Biosafety Issues 
 
Although the World Agroforesty Center (ICRAF), CIFOR (forestry) and the World Fish Center 
(WFC) do not presently work on LMOs, groups that they work with are likely to seek their help 
with biosafety issues in the future. These Canters should prepare themselves for this eventuality 
through active participation in a systemwide biosafety network and in biosafety training of staff 
members. 
 
4.5 Risk/benefit Analysis of Potential LMO Products 
Risk analysis and assessment of impacts on human and environmental health and safety is the 
overall method by which the biosafety of LMOs is evaluated. Under the prevailing risk approach, 
this has constituted a major ‘first hurdle’ that an LMO product must pass--quite far downstream 
in its development--before it can be considered for general release within a specific territory. 
Under the more forward-looking and preventative, safety first approach (Figure 4.2), risk 
analysis is iterative, starting at the earliest stage of LMO design and research through field testing 
and finally in applications for commercial approval, each time with more depth and drawing on 
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lessons learned at the earlier stage. The advantage of the safety first approach to risk analysis is 
that it offers a better chance of resolving major concerns in a scientifically and publicly credible 
manner by the time a product reaches the last iteration of risk analysis in an application for 
commercial approval. 
 
In some countries, biosafety has an even wider meaning that extends into additional dimensions 
of sustainability, where the socio-economic and agronomic impacts of both the LMO and the 
systems within which it would be used are considered. 
 
For example Directive 2001/18 of the European Union requires that member states assess the 
wider, indirect effects of releasing an LMO, and some member states are interpreting this as 
assessment of factors such as potential extension of range of a crop, changes in agrochemical 
loads on the environment, and impacts on crop rotations. Assessments of these factors inevitably 
lead to the identification of potential benefits or disadvantages associated with the use of the 
LMO. Although regulatory committees do not carry out a formal risk/benefit analysis, the trend 
in Europe is towards the provision of information that could be used as part of the wider 
decision-making process of giving consent for release, helping politicians to be better able to 
balance risks against probable benefits. 
 
Thus, under the prevailing risk approach, risk/benefit analysis occurs very far downstream in the 
research and development process and has become a ‘second hurdle’ that an LMO (or product 
derived from it) must overcome. Because of public concern, this hurdle is in some cases the main 
determinant of whether technology transfer is achieved. The questions are not only ‘is this 
product demonstrably safe?’ but also ‘is it wise to use this product in our country and will its use 
lead to more sustainable agricultural systems?’  A risk/benefit analysis is often carried out at the 
political level, but is often ill informed and partisan, with commercial interests trying to promote 
their product on the one hand and anti-GM organizations trying to argue that the risks outweigh 
the benefits. Controversy is further fuelled by the fact that the risk/benefit analysis occurs so late 
in the development process. Such conflict could be greatly reduced by taking a safety first 
approach, in which risk/benefit analysis would start as early as possible in research and 
development of an LMO by integrating it in, and parallel to, laboratory and field tests, rather 
than waiting until the point of applying for commercial approval. 
 
The Panel considered that it would be worthwhile asking the Centers whether there was a formal 
framework for risk/benefit analysis in existence within the Center. This was because they wanted 
to know how much of the expertise on ecological, human health, socio-economic and agronomic 
impacts that is needed to carry out such analyses resides within Centers and the wider 
networking that typifies the way Center staff work. 
 
The responses to the questionnaire show that one Center appears to have a formal framework in 
place for carrying out risk/benefit analysis. A number of Centers do not have a formal 
framework, but make the point that ‘informal’ risk/benefit analysis is carried out as part of the 
Centers’ process for determining research priorities. Other Centers may be developing formal 
methods for risk/benefit analysis, but do not yet have them in place. The costs of deployment of 
GE varieties have not been considered in such an analysis because they are to a great extent 
unknown.  
 
Centers largely agree that their staff has the knowledge and skills to be able to carry out 
risk/benefit analyses, especially if sufficient funds were available and they collaborated with 
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partner institutes. While they clearly have impressive expertise in agricultural sciences, they may 
lack other necessary expertise in evolutionary and ecological sciences, human health related 
fields (if the Center intends to address human health risks/benefits), and facilitation of multi-
stakeholder, deliberative processes. All Centers agreed that risk/benefit analyses would be 
worthwhile, with several making the point that a risk/benefit analysis would provide sound 
information to the public and politicians. Centers made the important point that risk/benefit 
analysis would help to convince both the Center itself and potential investors of the value of, and 
need for the LMO. Some Centers pointed out that such analyses should be made by comparing 
the impacts of the LMO with current crops and practices. Some Centers expressed the opinion 
that risk/benefit analyses would be worthwhile but should be made by the ‘target’ country, using 
information and expertise from Centers and NARS. Other Centers noted that given their situation 
in developing countries, little reliable data exist on some of the factors necessary for risk/benefit 
analysis, but as Centers and countries accumulate more experience and better capacity, more 
meaningful analyses can be conducted. 
 
It should be noted that the development of some LMOs is for research purposes only. Many of 
the transgenics that are being worked on now by the Centers will never make it to a "commercial" 
product. There are many examples where LMOs are being developed in order to advance the 
science, to develop an efficient transformation system for that species, to test the efficacy of a 
certain gene and so on. That might explain why many Centers do not yet have formal methods 
for risk/benefit analysis for potential commercial LMO-based products. 
 
Centers involved in developing LMOs should consider conducting research that compares the 
benefits and safety of an LMO to alternative methods of addressing the particular agricultural or 
food security problem. It would be important to involve an adequately interdisciplinary team of 
scientists in designing such research. Comparative research would provide a direct way of 
impartially testing the asserted benefits and of risks that arise in biosafety debates. 
 
Recommendation 9 - Undertake more Risk/benefit Analysis of Gene Technologies 
 
The Panel recommends that the Centers develop the capacity and seek additional resources for 
undertaking risk/benefit analyses of all LMOs under development. Specifically,  
 
the Panel recommends that Centers: 
 
• Develop and adopt formal methods for risk/benefit analysis of LMOs intended for 
commercial use. These should be based on credible research data, aimed primarily for use 
within the Center as part of their research prioritization and justification program, but which 
can also be used more widely. 
• Seek partners within target countries with the aim of developing risk/benefit analyses for the 
use of particular LMOs within specific territories. 
• Identify sufficient resources, within the Center and in partnership with target country 
institutes and industry, to carry out risk/benefit analysis at the earliest possible stage in the 
development of an LMO. 
• Identify sources and repositories for socio-economic, agronomic, ecological and human 
health data and expertise needed for risk/benefit analysis and support capacity building in 
this area. 
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• Incorporate comparisons, based on reliable research, including socio-economic research, of 
the benefits and safety of an LMO relative to alternative methods of addressing the particular 
agricultural or food security problem. 
 
4.6 Moving from Research to Product Development 
There are many LMOs currently at various stages of laboratory and field testing by the Centers 
and their partners. These potential products have primarily been developed for their promise as 
“international public goods”, able to address constraints and commodities that are not likely to 
be a priority for private companies (e.g. drought tolerance in African maize, disease resistance in 
cassava).  
 
The currently estimated cost of taking a LMO (e.g. a new crop variety) through the regulatory 
approval processes in North America is in the order of US$8-15M (as estimated by the US 
Biotechnology industry organization). These costs include substantial experimental work 
involved in the preparation of the data and dossiers required by regulatory authorities on which 
to base their decisions. Costs may vary depending on the demands of national regulatory systems 
and the novelty of the transformation, but they are likely to remain high, especially for first risk 
assessments of novel LMO products. The cost of deployment of an LMO in developing countries 
is very difficult to estimate. 
 
It is not clear how the Centers intend to mobilize the human and financial resources necessary to 
move the present list of experimental LMOs into potential product development, and indeed 
which of the current transgenics under development are likely to pass the rigorous regulatory 
and technical hurdles and be released as promising new technologies that will help improve food 
security and create wealth in developing countries.  
 
Recommendation 10 - Develop Plans for Preparing Risk Assessment Dossiers for Product 
Approval 
 
The Panel recommends that, in relation to the LMOs presently under development by the CGIAR 
Centers and their partners, the Centers need to assess the feasibility of some or all of these 
becoming new products. Plans for preparing risk assessment dossiers should be put in place at 
the earliest opportunity and should include realistic estimates of the scientific and financial 
resources that will be required to develop the dossiers, on which regulatory authorities will base 
their decisions about future product approval. 
 
4.7 Ethical Issues  
Development of new biotechnologies in clinical medicine and human genetics has for a long time 
taken place within well-developed and continuously evolving ethical frameworks. Not only do 
these frameworks reflect the constantly changing morals and ethical standards of societies in 
different parts of the world, but they also have the practical value that, if developments conform 
to existing ethical codes, they are much more likely to be acceptable to both politicians and the 
public. Technology transfer is much more likely, investment can be recovered and new research 
and development is more likely to be funded. Biosafety is inherent in ethical codes in this area, 
with a well-informed precautionary approach being taken in developments such as virus-
mediated vaccination, embryology and transplantation surgery. Ethical codes in these areas can 
provide a fundamental framework for biosafety, showing researchers where research and 
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development is currently permissible and where it may be undesirable, whilst at the same time 
providing sufficient freedom for scientific curiosity to be satisfied, and progress to be made. 
 
Biotechnology in agriculture, forestry and aquaculture has no such history of development of 
ethical codes, although there has been increasing interest in the ethics of these technologies over 
the past two decades. Much of this debate has been concerned with the perceived morality of 
transgenic technology, but only recently has the issue been taken forward into practical ethics. 
For example, in 2001 the UK Advisory Committee on Releases into the Environment (ACRE) 
published guidance for researchers that recommended best practice in the construction of 
transgenic crops. This was in effect an attempt at developing an ethical code for the early stages 
in the development of an LMO and made some important recommendations on the selection of 
plants to be transformed, use of markers and gene restriction technologies. Although the 
guidelines were not mandatory, they laid down some limits of acceptability and therefore 
influenced biosafety. The UK guidelines are available at 
www.defra.gov.uk/environment/acre/bestprac/guidance/index.htm.  
 
The CGIAR Centers have also produced guiding principles for research on GMOs that covers 
best practice in laboratories and for field trials, and has the elements of an ethical approach. 
 
Because of the link between biosafety and ethics, the Panel asked the Centers questions about 
whether the Center and host country had developed ethical codes, and whether they believed 
such codes would be beneficial.  
 
The responses to Section 6 of the questionnaire show that most Centers are aware of the need for 
ethical codes, but at the time of the survey there was a wide range of guidelines being used.  
Some Centers are actively using either CGIAR guidelines or “working principles” derived from 
them. Some Centers have formally adopted “Guiding principles on development and 
deployment of genetically engineered organisms” and others have developed their own 
“Biopolicy” or codes of best practice. Some have no codes, either because they have not yet 
developed them or they are not yet using gene  technology to produce LMOs. 
 
All Centers that responded to the questionnaire agreed that ethical codes were desirable “to 
avoid problems and gain public confidence”, “…. to promote its mission whilst also ensuring the 
trust and confidence of the public” and “…. ethical guidelines would, if well conceived, be 
beneficial to the research process, ensuring that research is conducted in a responsible manner 
and the concerns/interests of all stakeholders are considered and addressed….”.  One view was 
that although ethical codes would be valuable, there was a risk that they could impede progress.  
 
Recommendation 11 - Better Address Bioethical Issues 
 
The Panel recommends that:  
 
• Centers share their experiences and develop a unified approach to the production and 
maintenance of ethical codes covering research and development of LMOs. 
• Centers identify key stakeholders both in their host countries, target countries and among 
donors and promote their involvement in developing and maintaining ethical codes. 
• Each Center maintains a standing Ethics Committee advising the Biosafety Committee. We 
recommend that role of the Ethics Committee should be both to maintain ethical standards 
and codes used by the Center and to consider and address the ethical dimensions both of the 
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Center research program as a whole, and individual research projects. We recommend that 
the Committee has at least half of its members drawn from stakeholder bodies outside the 
Center, and reports directly to the Center Director General.  
• Centers and CGIAR as a whole publicize their development and use of ethical codes aiming 
to increase public confidence in their research.  
 
4.8 Implementation Plan 
Several of the Centers and other stakeholders who commented on the Panel’s draft report noted 
the desirability of the Centers and others involved in biosafety with the Centers and their 
research partners to come together to discuss the implications of the Panel’s recommendations 
and how these may be implemented.  
 
There may be an opportunity to conduct the workshop in association with the new Program on 
Biosafety Systems, which is being managed by ISNAR and IFPRI, and in which several other 
Centers are also participating. Other Centers may also be interested in hosting the workshop in 
2004. 
 
Recommendation 12 - Initiate a CGIAR System Biosafety Workshop to Plan a more Proactive, 
Research-based Approach to Biosafety by the CGIAR Centers 
 
The Panel recommends that, in order to ensure that the results of the CGIAR investments in gene 
technology are able to be used with safety and confidence, the Biosafety Panel report and its 
recommendations be discussed at a workshop involving members of the CGIAR Science Council, 
the Biosafety Panel, representatives of the CGIAR Centers, their R&D partners and other 
stakeholders, including national regulators, policy makers, civil society, farmers and consumers. 
The purpose of the workshop would be to develop an implementation plan for a proactive, 
research based approach to biosafety by the CGIAR Centers and their partners.  
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ANNEXES 
ANNEX A 
 
BIOSAFETY PANEL TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
CGIAR iSC Biosafety Study Panel on the Safe Use of Gene Technology and its Products 
 
Summary Terms of Reference 
 
The Panel, commissioned by the CGIAR interim Science Council (iSC), will undertake a study of 
biosafety policies and practices in the CGIAR System and make recommendations to the interim 
Science Council on future CGIAR policies and practices and the future CGIAR research agenda in 
relation to these issues. Specifically, the Biosafety Study Panel will assess and make recommendations 
in the following areas: 
 
1. Present Biosafety Policy and Practices: Assess the present CGIAR policies and the policies and 
practices of the CGIAR Centers in regard to the safe use of gene technology and its products. 
2. Risk/benefit Analysis of Potential Products: Identify potential near term products of gene 
technology developed by the CGIAR Centers and their research partners that are ready for 
evaluation and assess the plans of the Centers for undertaking such evaluations in partnership 
with their host countries and other collaborators.  
3. Case Studies: Develop a suite of case studies that would serve as illustrations of the range of 
biosafety-related issues facing the CGIAR Centers and their partners in developing countries, and 
identify how these issues may be resolved. The case studies may include biosafety issues affecting 
the conservation of biodiversity, the development of new plant varieties to address biotic and 
abiotic stresses, the applications of gene technology to fish improvement and the development of 
new vaccines for the control of livestock diseases.  
4. Future CGIAR Research Agenda: Make recommendations on the possible future research agenda 
and research strategies for the CGIAR Centers on biosafety related issues, whereby the Centers 
could contribute data to illuminate the biosafety debate, based on the comparative advantages of 
the Centers.  
5. Future CGIAR Policies and Practices: Make recommendation to the Science Council on the 
possible future CGIAR policies and practices in biosafety to guide the Centers and their partners 
in the safe use of gene technology and its products. This will include advice on how the CGIAR 
System can continue to monitor developments in this fast changing field and have in place 
mechanisms (including the necessary institutional strengths) to ensure that the principles and 
practices of the Centers reflect current best practices and timely responses to emerging issues.  
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ANNEX B 
 
BIOSAFETY PANEL MEMBERS CONTACT DETAILS 
 
CHAIR: 
 
Brian Johnson 
Head of Agricultural Technologies Group 
English Nature 
Tauton TA1 5AA 
UK 
tel: ++ 44 (0) 1823 283211 
fax ++ 44 (0) 1823 272978 
Email: brian.johnson@English-Nature.org.uk 
b.Johnson@btinternet.com 
 
 
SCIENTIFIC SECRETARY: 
 
Gabrielle Persley 
Chair, The Doyle Foundation 
99 Sherwood Rd,  Toowong 
Brisbane 
AUSTRALIA 4066.  
Tel 61 7 38705504 
Fax 61 7 38705240 
Email: g.persley@uq.edu.au 
g.persley@doylefoundation.org 
 
 
MEMBERS: 
 
Virendra Lal Chopra 
President, National Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences 
NASC Complex, DPS Marg 
Pusa Campus 
New Delhi 110012 
INDIA 
Tel: 91-11-25846051-52, 55 (Office) 
91-11-25553747 (Res.) 
Fax: 91-011-25846054 
E-mail: naas@vsnl.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anne R. Kapuscinski 
Professor of Fisheries and Conservation 
Biology 
Director, Institute for Social, Economic & 
Ecological Sustainability (ISEES) 
186 McNeal Hall 
University of Minnesota 
1985 Buford Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55108 
USA 
Tel: 1-612- 624-7719 
Fax: 1- 612-625-8153 
Email : kapus001@umn.edu 
Ark55@mindspring.com 
Copy messages to  
isees@umn.edu. 
Tel: 1- 612-6247723 
 
Norah K. Olembo 
Professor, Department of Biochemistry, 
University of Nairobi  
P.O. Box 25004 
Jaceranda 
Nairobi, KENYA 
Tel: 254 20 568695 
Mobile 254 733 854575 
Fax: 254 2 568 695 h  
e-mail: noraholembo@yahoo.com 
Copy messages to bta@swiftkenya.com 
 
RESOURCE PERSON: 
 
Amir Kassam 
Senior Officer 
CGIAR Science Council Secretariat (SDRC) 
Food and Agriculture Organization 
Viale delle Terme di Caracalla 
00100 Rome, ITALY 
Tel: +39-06 5705 6226 
Fax: +39-06 5705 3298 
Email: Amir.Kassam@fao.org 
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ANNEX D 
 
BIOSAFETY PANEL QUESTIONNAIRE TO CGIAR CENTERS 
 
 
CGIAR iSC Secretariat, Rome 
13 May 2003 
 
Memo to CGIAR Director Generals 
 
Re:  CGIAR iScience Council Biosafety Study 
 
Dear Colleague, 
 
 Over the past decade developments in biotechnology, particularly applications of gene 
technology, have shown promise for improving agricultural productivity and animal health. 
Most CGIAR Centers have adopted the use of gene technology not only in their research but also 
in the transfer of technologies to address biotic and abiotic stresses in their respective geographic 
regions.  
 
 In handling gene technology and its products, it has become important that biosafety 
issues are considered. Biosafety has emerged as one of the key issues in the transfer of research 
and development of transgenic organisms to beneficial use. It is in this respect that the CGIAR 
has requested the interim Science Council to carry out a study on current biosafety policies and 
practices of the CGIAR Centers and future needs.  The interim Science Council has therefore 
appointed a Panel to conduct out this strategic study. The Panel is meeting this week in Rome. A 
list of Panel members is attached.  
 
 It is very much in the interests of all CGIAR Centers to participate in this study, which 
aims to make recommendations for identifying and sharing best practice in biosafety across the 
Centers. Based on the information obtained during the study, the Panel may also make 
recommendations for future biosafety-related research and further development of policies, 
procedures and practices. At this stage the study is only concerned with the biosafety of 
transgenic organisms (those defined as living modified organisms-LMOs-in the Biosafety 
Protocol of the Convention on Biological Diversity).  
 
 To facilitate this study the Panel has prepared the attached questionnaire for data 
collection from Centers, which in addition to case studies and other relevant documentation will 
form the basis upon which the Panel’s recommendations will be made.  
 
 The participation of you and your colleagues in completing the questionnaire and 
providing any other relevant information on biosafety policies and practices in your Center 
would be greatly appreciated. We would prefer that all information is submitted to the Panel in 
electronic form.  
 
 Please answer those parts of the questionnaire that are relevant to activities within your 
Center or within joint projects involving your Center. 
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 Information submitted to the Panel will be treated carefully and any confidentiality 
identified by Centers will be respected. The study Panel will be preparing a draft report for the 
iSC, an early draft of which will be sent to Centers for comment.  
 
 This study will be a consultative process between the Panel and Centers. To facilitate this 
process, we would like you to identify a key contact within your Center, and advise the Panel’s 
Scientific Secretary, Gabrielle Persley, of their name and contact details. Gabrielle can be 
contacted at g.persley@doylefoundation.org and by Tel/fax at 44 141 9423331.     
 
 It would be very much appreciated if your completed questionnaire could be sent 
electronically to the Panel by June 6, at the latest. Please send the reply to Gabrielle Persley with a 
copy to Amir Kassam at the iSC Secretariat (amir.kassam@fao.org) and the contact Panel member 
for your Center, who will be in contact with you in the near future.   
 
 Should you have any immediate queries please contact either myself or Gabrielle.  
 
 The Panel looks forward to working with you in this important area, and thanks you in 
anticipation of your cooperation.  
 
 Yours sincerely 
 
 Brian Johnson 
 
 Chair 
 CGIAR iSC Biosafety Panel 
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May 13 2003 
CGIAR interim Science Council Biosafety Study 2003 
 
Biosafety Panel Questionnaire for CGIAR Centers 
 
1. Biosafety Case Studies   
 
In order to illustrate some practical examples of how biosafety is conducted within the CGIAR 
Centers and their host countries the Panel would like to present some ‘biosafety case studies’ in 
the report to the CGIAR Science Council. Please choose at least one and no more than three recent 
examples appropriate to the Center from the list below and attach a summary of the biosafety 
procedures, protocols and practices to which the LMO has been subjected during its 
development. The case studies should be no more than 10 pages. The full risk assessment may be 
included as an annex.  
 
The following details should be included in the case history:  
 
• Details of biosafety measures applied both in containment and in the field; and how they 
were/are audited and monitored;  
• Dates of applications and consents issued; 
• Identification of committees and regulatory laws/statutes involved; 
• Summary of the risk assessment conducted: 
a) Identified hazards and methods/information sources used to identify them;  
b) Assessed risk of each identified hazard and methods/information sources used to assess 
them;  
c) Final risk decision;  
d) Summary of monitoring plan for post-release (if there is one), including what it is 
designed to monitor and methods;  
e) Experience to date with implementation of monitoring.  
• Future stages in the development and monitoring program for the LMO in question and 
probable timescales. 
 
Other Issues to be Addressed in Case Studies  
 
The issues to be addressed in biosafety risk assessments are described further in Annexes 1 and 2 
attached to this questionnaire. Annex 1 deals with issues during the developmental stages of 
living modified organisms (LMOs). Annex 2 deals with issues associated with risk assessment of 
LMOs at the commercial release application stage. It would assist the Panel’s understanding of 
biosafety policies and practices at the CGIAR centers by consideration of how the relevant issues 
are addressed in specific cases.   
 
Possible Topics for Illustrative Biosafety Case Studies 
 
• Transgenic crops for release in centers of origin and sexually compatible crop 
biodiversity. (Please include assessment of potential impacts on the CGIAR gene banks) 
• Bt maize   
• Herbicide tolerant rice for release in Asia and/or the Americas 
 39 
• Salt and drought tolerant plants (e.g. cereals, forage crops and grasses)  
• New vaccines (e.g. for East Coast Fever in cattle in Africa).  
• Transgenic fish for release in Asia and/or Africa 
• Vegetatively propagated crops such as banana, cassava, potato or  sweet potato with pest 
or disease resistance 
 
If no appropriate case study appears on the above list, please include a recent example selected 
from the experience of the Center.  
 
2. Biosafety Policy and Practices 
 
2.1. Does your Center have a specific framework for biosafety policy and practices? Please 
attach a copy of the present policy and associated biosafety guidelines in use at the Center.  
2.2. Who developed the framework?  
• Center staff alone?  
• Center staff in consultation with CGIAR secretariat?  
• Center staff in consultation with host country regulators? 
• Other – please specify 
 
2.3. Briefly describe the fields of expertise in science and policy that were represented by the 
entire group who developed the policy. 
2.4. Does your host country have a framework for biosafety policy/regulation?  
If not, what is the present status of development of such a framework.  
 
2.5. Does the host country have a framework for biosafety practices, such as for conducting 
scientific biosafety research and assessments? If not, what is the present status of 
development of such a framework.  
2.6. In your view do your biosafety policy and practices meet/fall short of/exceed the biosafety 
requirements of the host country? Please explain. 
2.7. Do your biosafety policies and practices meet/fall short of/exceed the host    country’s 
capacity for developing or implementing biosafety policy and practices? Please explain. 
2.8. Have you encountered any problems in dealing with host country policies and practices?  
2.9. Please give brief details of any current biosafety-related research conducted by the Center, 
or in partnership with others.  
2.10. What do you see as your future biosafety-related research needs?    
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3. Host Country and Center Biosafety Committees 
 
3.1. Describe whether applications for LMO use for release into the environment (that involve 
your CGIAR Center) go through a review or approval process by host country and Center 
safety committees. What is/are the committee(s) called and where is/are it/they situated? 
3.2. Are risk assessments submitted to a Committee(s) within your center prior to submission 
to the host country regulatory system? If not, please describe the system in place. 
3.3. Who does risk assessment studies? The developer of LMOs/An independent agency 
identified by the Committee/ Any other (specify)?  
3.4. Are these findings open to public scrutiny?  If so how is this done? 
3.5. Is legal consent from the committee(s) needed for laboratory containment or experimental 
(confined) field trials to take place, or is it an advisory committee(s)? 
3.6. Please attach a list of the institutions and fields of scientific, technical, and policy expertise 
represented on the host country safety committee(s). Please indicate the proportion of the 
committee that is made up of people employed by or associated with your Center?  
Include reference to: 
• Center staff 
• Independent members 
• Host country regulators 
• Civil society representatives/NGOs   
 
3.7. What proportion of the current biosafety committee(s) has direct or indirect commercial 
interests in biotechnology companies? 
3.8. Does the committee(s); (a) review applications for, and (b) inspect or audit approved 
projects for biosafety in containment situations such as Center laboratories? 
3.9. Does the committee(s) (a) review applications for and (b) inspect or audit approved 
projects in confinement situations, such as field trials involving work supported by the 
CGIAR Center?  
4. Effectiveness of the risk assessment framework 
 
4.1. Is a formal risk assessment prepared for all potentially useful LMOs before field trials/ 
commercial release?  If not please explain why. 
4.2. Is a monitoring plan to verify conclusions from the risk assessment and identify 
unforeseen problems put in place before the release takes place? 
What entities are responsible for carrying out the monitoring plan? How is the monitoring 
paid for? 
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5. Risk/benefit Analysis of Potential Products:  
 
5.1. Is there a formal framework for risk/benefit analysis of LMOs in place at your Center?  
5.2. If yes, please describe the approach of your risk/benefit analysis framework, such as how 
risk and benefit components are identified, methodologies used. If possible please supply 
documentation used in your Center. 
5.3. Is a formal risk/benefit analysis undertaken for each potentially useful LMO?  
5.4. If not, in your view would your Center be able to conduct such an analysis?  
5.5. In your view would such analyses be worthwhile? Why?  
6. Code of Ethics 
 
6.1. Is there a code of ethics that covers development of LMOs within the Center (and/or host 
country)?  
6.2. If so, please attach a copy of the code or summarize what topics the code covers. 
6.3. If not, does your Center believe that such a code might be either beneficial or detrimental 
to progress and why?   
7. Future developments 
 
7.1. Please list the near term products of gene technology at your Center that will be ready for 
safety evaluation for field trials within the next five years, including those that have 
already been evaluated for safety but have not yet gone to field trials.  
7.2. Please attach one or two summary examples of the proposed safety assessments for these 
products, if available. 
7.3. In your experience how long does it take to prepare a safety assessment for experimental 
field release (including collecting and evaluating biosafety data)?   
• Between one and six months 
• More than six months 
• More than one year 
 
7.4. What are the constraints for the Center in addressing biosafety issues and conducting risk 
assessments for LMOs?   
7.5. Is there any other information you consider may be relevant to our understanding of 
biosafety and risk assessment within your Center and host country? 
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Attachment 
Annex 1 - Biosafety Case Studies: Issues to be Addressed 
Risk Assessment and Monitoring Issues in Developmental Stages of an LMO 
 
1. Development of LMOs in Laboratories 
1.1. Within laboratories of your Center, are there formal biosafety guidelines for the 
construction of LMOs intended for commercial use?  If so, please attach a copy.  
1.2. To what extent do these guidelines cover: 
• Selection of organisms to be transformed 
• Choice of marker genes  
• Choice of promoters 
• Characterization of transformation (e.g. copy numbers, insertion site(s), flanking 
sequences, integrity of insertions, stability of insertions) 
• Preparation and supply of diagnostic primers (to identify the transformation) 
• Genetic isolation/restriction technologies for biosafety purposes 
• Other strategies for biological confinement of the LMOs where applicable, (e.g. 
sterilizing fish via changes in ploidy number). 
 
1.3. Are diagnostic primers for LMOs made available to host country regulators and published 
worldwide?  Please list a few examples of print and/or electronic (Internet) publishing of 
primers. 
1.4. Is there a formal system of bio-containment (for labs) operating within the Center?  If yes, 
briefly describe the system in relation to this case study and describe how bio-containment 
was monitored. 
2. Field Trials for LMOs  
 
Small-scale experimental trials (e.g. less than 50 ha total for annual crops; confined fish tanks or ponds at a 
research station) 
 
2.1. Where are experimental field trials held?   
• At the Center 
• On land controlled by the Center 
• On land controlled by private farmers 
• Other 
 
2.2. Is a register of field trials maintained?   
2.3. What data/information are recorded within the register? Please list the categories.  
2.4. How are data held (electronically, paper)? 
2.5. Where are data held (Center, host country regulatory authorities)? 
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2.6. Is there a biosafety protocol (i.e. a set of bio-confinement measures plus the chain of 
responsibility for achieving the measures) in place for field trials?   
2.7. Does the protocol cover: 
• Measures of physical, mechanical or biological confinement of the LMO from non-
LMO crops and wild or weedy relatives (e.g. planting separation distances from 
conventional crops; screens and other mechanical barriers to prevent escape of fish 
LMO from testing tanks.) 
• Emergency procedures for natural and human-caused breakdowns in confinement 
measures 
• Post-harvest monitoring  
 
2.8. How, if at all, is gene flow monitored during small-scale field trials? Does this include 
gene flow to conventional crops, wild relatives, weedy relatives? 
2.9. How, if at all, are impacts of the LMO on biodiversity of flora and fauna in the field trial 
area (farm field, fish pond area) and readily accessible ecosystems monitored? 
2.10. Are these data available for public scrutiny and if so how is this achieved?  
3. Extended (Commercial-scale) Trials 
3.1. How is the decision made to move from experimental trials to ‘commercial-scale’ field 
trials? 
• By a committee within the Center? 
• By a host country independent committee? 
• Joint decision by the Centers and the host country 
• Other 
 
3.2. Where are extended field trials held? 
• On production-scale facilities (e.g. farm fields, fish ponds) owned and managed by 
private farmers 
• On production-scale facilities managed by the state 
• On experimental fields of Agricultural Universities/research organizations 
• All of the above 
• Other – please specify 
 
3.3. What is monitored and evaluated during extended trials? For example: 
• Agronomic characteristics (yield, disease resistance, growth etc) 
• Gene flow (pollen, seeds, whole organisms) 
• Impacts on biodiversity (where, how?) 
• Impacts on non-biotic environment (water, soils) 
• Potential socio-economic impacts 
• Other factors, including those listed in Annex 2 – please specify 
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3.4. What (if any) post-harvest monitoring is done after commercial-scale trials?  
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Annex  2 - Identification of Hazards and Exposure Associated with LMOs at Commercial 
Release Developmental Stage 
 
How does the Center biosafety framework identify the relevant potential direct and indirect 
hazards to address in a risk assessment for commercial release in your specific LMO case(s)? 
How does it assess the risk of each identified hazard? In responding to this question, consider the 
following examples of issues, recognizing that this list is not comprehensive nor appropriate to 
each case, but rather to help you develop a response to Question 1 on case studies.  
 
1. Direct Risks from LMOs 
1.1. Gene flow from pollen or other propagules (seed, whole organisms, fragments of 
organisms) from crop to crop and to wild relatives (including fish to fish, tree to tree etc). 
• Assessment of potential rates of gene flow under different environmental conditions in 
which the LMO is to be deployed (prior to release into the environment 
• Assessment of potential impacts of gene flow (e.g. weediness and potential impacts on 
fitness). 
• Assessment of potential inadvertent gene stacking (due to gene flow from two or more 
lines of LMO).  
• Assessment of potential interactions of new-release LMO with LMOs that have already 
been released. 
 
1.2. Assessment of Toxicity/Allergenicity/Nutritional value of the LMO and its derivative 
foods to humans.  
• Hazard of altered biochemical content of the LMO that could harm humans or wildlife. 
Could include assessment of potential toxicity to wildlife likely to be in contact/ feeding 
on the LMO 
• Methodologies and types of data used to make these assessments (e.g. by animal feeding 
trials/ molecular characterization etc). 
 
2. Indirect Risks from LMOs 
• Assessment of potential changes in management of the LMO: how the LMO might 
change crop/organism management (e.g. pesticide use, fertilizer use, cultivation methods 
and timing, pollution load from fish farm effluent). 
• Assessment of potential changes in range/substitution. How introduction of the LMO 
might change the geographic range of cropping or how introduction of the LMO might 
substitute for existing crops (or fish/trees etc). 
• Assessment of the potential impacts on abiotic resources (e.g. water, soils) within the 
intended release area. 
• Assessment of potential socio-economic changes. Likely socio-economic impacts of the 
introduction of the LMO. 
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